We present novel homomorphic encryption schemes for integer arithmetic, intended primarily for use in secure single-party computation in the cloud. These schemes are capable of securely computing arbitrary degree polynomials homomorphically. In practice, ciphertext size and running times limit the polynomial degree, but this appears sufficient for most practical applications. We present four schemes, with increasing levels of security, but increasing computational overhead. Two of the schemes provide strong security for high-entropy data. The remaining two schemes provide strong security regardless of this assumption. These four algorithms form the first two levels of a hierarchy of schemes, and we also present the general cases of each scheme. We further elaborate how a fully homomorphic system can be constructed from one of our general cases. In addition, we present a variant based upon Chinese Remainder Theorem secret sharing. We detail extensive evaluation of the first four algorithms of our hierarchy by computing low-degree polynomials. The timings of these computations are extremely favourable by comparison with even the best of existing methods and dramatically outperform many well-publicised schemes. The results clearly demonstrate the practical applicability of our schemes.
Introduction
With services like Amazon's Elastic MapReduce [4] and Microsoft's HDInsight [59] offering large-scale distributed cloud computing environments, computation in the cloud is becoming increasingly more available. Such services allow for computation on large volumes of data to be performed without the large investment in local computing resources. However, where the data that is processed is sensitive, such as financial or medical data, then uploading such data in its raw form to such a third-party service becomes problematic.
To take advantage of these cloud services, we require a means to process the data securely on such a platform. We designate such a computation, secure computation in the A preliminary version of this paper [39] was presented at IMACC 2017.
B James Dyer james.dyer@dmu.ac.uk 1 De Montfort University, Leicester, UK 2 School of Computing, University of Leeds, Leeds, UK cloud (SCC). SCC should not expose input or output data to any other party, including the cloud service provider. Furthermore, the details of the computation should not allow any other party to deduce its inputs and outputs. Cryptography seems the natural approach to this problem.
However, it should be noted that van Dijk and Juels [36] show that cryptography alone cannot realise secure multiparty computation in the cloud, where the parties jointly compute a function over their inputs while keeping their own inputs private. Since our approach is via homomorphic encryption, we will restrict our attention to what we will call secure single-party computation in the cloud (SSCC).
Homomorphic encryption (HE) appears to offer a solution to the SSCC problem. First defined by Rivest et al. [70] in 1978, HE allows a function to be computed on encrypted inputs without ever decrypting the inputs. Suppose we wish to compute the function f on inputs x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x n , then, under HE, Dec( f (x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x n )) = f (x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x n ), where x 1 , . . . , x n are the encryptions of x 1 , . . . , x n , f is the equivalent of f in the ciphertext space, and Dec is the decryption function. HE clearly satisfies some of the requirements for secure computation in the cloud. A somewhat HE scheme (SWHE) is a scheme which is homomorphic for only limited inputs and functions. Fully HE (FHE) is a scheme that is homomorphic for all functions and inputs. This was first realised by Gentry in 2009 [44] and appeared to be the ideal HE scheme.
However, despite the clear advantages of FHE, and many significant advances [18, 20] , it remains largely impractical. Two implementations of recent FHE schemes, HELib [49] and FHEW [37] , both perform very poorly in practice, in both their running time and space requirements (see Sect. 2.6) .
In this paper, we present four novel SWHE schemes for encryption of integers that are additively and multiplicatively homomorphic. These schemes are capable of computing arbitrary degree polynomials. In Sect. 2, we present our usage scenario, a summary of our results, and a discussion of related work. We present our initial homomorphic scheme in Sect. 3, in two variants, HE1 and HE1N. HE1 (Sect. 3.1) provides strong security for integers distributed with sufficient entropy. This security derives from the assumed hardness of the partial approximate common divisor problem (PACDP). HE1N (Sect. 3.2) guarantees strong security for integers not distributed with sufficient entropy or where the distribution is not known, by adding an additional "noise" term. In addition to the hardness assumption, we prove that HE1N is IND-CPA secure [6] . Section 4 describes a further two variants, HE2 and HE2N, which increase the entropy of the plaintext by adding a dimension to the ciphertexts, which are 2-vectors. This further increases the security of these schemes by effectively doubling the entropy. HE2 (Sect. 4.1) deals with integers of sufficient entropy, HE2N (Sect. 4.2) with integers without the required entropy or of unknown distribution. HE2N also satisfies IND-CPA. We describe this in some detail, since it appears to be practically useful, and is the simplest version of our general scheme. In Sect. 5, we generalise HE2 and HE2N from 2-vectors to k-vectors, for arbitrary k, in the scheme HEk, with noisy variant HEkN. These schemes may also be practical for small enough k. In Sect. 6, we detail a variant of our HE2N scheme that employs Chinese Remainder Theorem secret sharing to allow one to process the computation by dividing into subcomputations on smaller moduli. In Sect. 7, we show how to construct a fully homomorphic system from our HEk scheme.
We have performed extensive experimental evaluation of the four schemes presented in this paper. We report on this in Sect. 8. Our results are extremely favourable when compared with other methods. In some cases, our algorithms outperform the running times of directly comparable schemes by a factor of up to 1000, and considerably more than that for fully homomorphic schemes, used in the same context. Finally, in Sect. 9, we conclude the paper.
Background

Scenario
As introduced above, our work concerns secure single-party computation in the cloud. In our scenario, a secure client wishes to compute a function on a large volume of data. This function could be searching or sorting the data, computing an arithmetic function of numeric data, or any other operation. We consider here the case where the client wishes to perform arithmetic computations on numeric data. This data might be the numeric fields within a record, with non-numeric fields being treated differently.
The client delegates the computation to the cloud. However, while the data is in the cloud, it could be subject to snooping, including by the cloud provider. The client does not wish to expose the input data, or the output of the computation, to possible snooping in the cloud. A snooper here will be a party who may observe the data and the computation in the cloud, but cannot, or does not, change the data or insert spurious data. (In our setting, data modification would amount to pointless vandalism.) The snooping may be casual, displaying an uninvited interest, or malicious, intending to use data for the attacker's own purposes.
To obtain the required data privacy, the client's function will be computed homomorphically on an encryption of the data. The client encrypts the source data using a secret key and uploads the encryption to the cloud, with a homomorphic equivalent of the target computation. The cloud environment performs the homomorphic computation on the encrypted data. The result of the homomorphic computation is returned to the client, who decrypts it using the secret key, and obtains the output of the computation.
In this scenario, the source data is never exposed in the cloud, but encryptions of it are. A snooper may observe the computation of the equivalent homomorphic function in the cloud environment. As a result, they may be able to deduce what operations are performed, even though they do not know the inputs. A snooper may also be able to inspect the (encrypted) working data generated by the cloud computation and even perform side computations of their own. However, snoopers have no access to the secret key, so cannot make encryptions of their own.
Definitions and notation
x ← $ S denotes a value x chosen uniformly at random from the discrete set S.
x ← p S denotes a prime number x chosen uniformly at random from the discrete set S.
KGen : S → K denotes the key generation function operating on the security parameter space S whose range is the secret key space K.
Enc : M × K → C denotes the symmetric encryption function operating on the plaintext space M and the secret key space K, whose range is the ciphertext space C.
Dec : C × K → M denotes the symmetric decryption function operating on the ciphertext space C and the secret key space K, whose range is the plaintext space M.
Add : C × C → C denotes the homomorphic addition function whose domain is C 2 whose range is C.
Mult : C × C → C denotes the homomorphic multiplication function whose domain is C 2 whose range is C. log denotes log e and lg denotes log 2 .
If λ is a security parameter, "with high probability" will mean with probability 1 − 2 − λ , for some constant > 0.
Polynomial time or space will mean polynomial in the security parameter λ.
Formal model of scenario
We will consider three measures of the entropy of X , measured in bits:
, with equality if and only if X has the uniform distribution on [0, M), in which case all three are lg M. We will denote H ∞ (X ) by ρ, so it also follows that H 1 (X ), H 2 (X ) ≥ ρ. We use the term "entropy" without qualification to mean min entropy,
We wish to compute a multivariate polynomial P of degree d on these inputs. A secure client A selects an instance Enc(K , ·) of the encryption algorithm Enc using the secret parameter set K . A encrypts the n inputs by computing uploads c 1 , c 2 , . . . , c n and P to the cloud computing environment, where P is the homomorphic equivalent of P in the ciphertext space. The cloud environment computes P (c 1 , c 2 , . . . , c n ). A retrieves P (c 1 , c 2 , . . . , c n ) from the cloud and computes
A snooper is only able to inspect c 1 , c 2 , . . . , c n , the function P , and the computation of P (c 1 , c 2 , . . . , c n ), including subcomputations and working data, and perform side computations on these. 1 Thus, the snooper is passive or honest-but-curious [45] .
Observations from scenario
First, we can observe that symmetric key encryption is sufficient for the model. Public key encryption is not necessary because there is no key escrow or distribution problem. Additionally, even though the public parameters of our symmetric schemes are exposed to the cloud, they do not provide an encryption oracle.
Note that the n inputs do not necessarily need to be uploaded at once, but n is an upper bound on the total number of inputs. For example, if the polynomial is separable we might compute it in separate stages, and this might be useful in more dynamic situations.
This model is clearly susceptible to certain attacks. We consider ciphertext only, brute force, and cryptanalytic attacks. To avoid cryptanalytic attacks, we must choose the parameters of the system carefully. Here, a brute force attack will mean guessing the plaintext associated with a ciphertext. In our encryption schemes, it will be true that a guess can be verified. Since ξ i ≤ 2 −ρ for i ∈ [0, M), the expected number μ of guesses before making a correct guess satisfies μ ≥ 2 ρ . Massey [58] gave a corresponding result in terms of the Shannon entropy H 1 (X ).
Similarly, probability of any correct guess in 2 ρ/2 guesses is at most 2 −ρ/2 . This bound holds if we need only guess one of n inputs, m 1 , m 2 , . . . , m n , even if these inputs are not independent. Therefore, if ρ is large enough, a brute force attack is infeasible. An example of high-entropy data is salaries for a large national or multinational business. Low-entropy data might include enumerated types, such as gender.
In our model, known plaintext attack (KPA) is possible only by brute force, and not through being given a sample of plaintext, ciphertext pairs. Chosen plaintext attack (CPA) or chosen ciphertext attack (CCA) does not appear relevant to our model. Since Enc(K , ·) is never exposed in the cloud, there is no realistic analogue of an encryption or decryption oracle, as required by these attacks. In public key encryption, an encryption algorithm is available as part of the system, so CPA should be forestalled, though failure to satisfy IND-CPA [7] does not imply that we can break the system.
Following [6] , it is common in studying symmetric key encryption to suppose that, in most practical settings, defence against CPA or CCA is necessary. While IND-CPA and IND-CCA are clearly desirable properties for a cryptosystem, their necessity, in the symmetric key context, seems hard to justify. Both [9] and [14] provide examples intended to support this convention. However, these examples are unconvincing. Nevertheless, we show that the "N" variants of our HE schemes below do satisfy IND-CPA.
We note that observation of the function P , which closely resembles P, might leak some information about its inputs. However, we assume that this information is far too weak to threaten the security of the system, as is common in the HE literature. However, if the threat is significant, "garbled circuits" [45] are a possible solution.
Finally, we note that our model of SSCC is very similar to the model of private single-client computing, described in [36] . Furthermore, they describe an example practical application, a privacy-preserving tax return preparation program, which computes the relevant statistics on government servers without revealing the client's inputs. Another example, cited in [57] , is a device which collects health data which is streamed to the cloud. Statistics are computed on the data and reported back to the device. To protect the patient's privacy, this data is encrypted by the device and the computations are performed homomorphically. Erkin et al. [41] employ a similar scenario in the description of their privacypreserving face recognition algorithm.
Our results
We describe new practical HE schemes for the encryption of integers, to be employed in a SSCC system inspired by the HE scheme CryptDB [65] . CryptDB encrypts integers using the Paillier cryptosystem [63] which is additively homomorphic 2 . Similar systems [76, 77] use ElGamal [40] to support multiplications. The "unpadded" versions of these schemes must be used. These are not secure under CPA [47] , reduc-ing the advantage of a public key system. These schemes do not support both addition and multiplication. Computing the inner product function requires re-encrypting the data once the multiplications have been done, so that the additions can be performed. In a SSCC system, this requires shipping the data back to the initiator for re-encryption, a significant communication overhead. We aim to support both addition and multiplication without this overhead. It should also be noted that a hybrid scheme of Paillier and ElGamal, for a given modulus, will be limited in the degree of polynomials that can be computed. Should a product or sum exceed the modulus, then the result cannot be successfully decrypted.
Our scheme is inspired by the SWHE scheme of van Dijk et al. that is used as the basis for a public key system. As in their system, we add multiples of integers to the plaintext to produce a ciphertext. However, [35] supports only arithmetic mod 2. We generalise their scheme to larger moduli.
We showed above that the input data must have sufficient entropy to negate brute force attacks. If the data lacks sufficient entropy, we will introduce more in two ways. The first adds random "noise" of sufficient entropy to the ciphertext, to "mask" the plaintext. This approach is employed in [35] . In our "N" variants below, we add a random multiple (from 0 to κ) of a large integer, κ, to the ciphertext, such that m i < κ, for all i ∈ [1, N ] . If the entropy of the original data was ρ, it becomes ρ + lg κ. Therefore, if κ is large enough, our data has sufficient entropy. But there is a downside. If the noise term grows too large, the ciphertext cannot be decrypted successfully. So we are restricted to computing polynomials of bounded degree, but this does not appear to be a practical problem.
The other technique will be to increase the dimension of the ciphertext. We represent the ciphertext as a k-vector, where each element is a linear function of the plaintext. Addition and multiplication of ciphertexts use linear algebra. The basic case k = 1 is described in Sect. 3.1. Then we can increase the entropy by creating a k-vector ciphertext. Then we must guess k plaintexts to break the system. Assuming that the inputs m 1 , m 2 , . . . , m n are chosen independently from D, and the entropy is ρ, the entropy of a k-tuple (m 1 , m 2 , . . . , m k ) is kρ. Thus, the k-vectors effectively have entropy kρ. If k is chosen large enough, we have sufficient entropy to prevent brute force attack. The assumption of independence among m 1 , m 2 , . . . , m n can be relaxed, to allow some correlation, but we will not discuss the details. On the upside, some cryptanalytic attacks for k = 1 do not seem to generalise even to k = 2. The downside is that ciphertexts are k times larger, and each homomorphic multiplication requires Ω(k 3 ) time and space. For very large k, this probably renders the methods impractical. Therefore, we consider the case k = 2 in Sect. 4. The general case is considered in Sect. 5.
Our work here supports computing arbitrary degree multivariate polynomials on integer data. However, we expect that for many practical applications, computing low-degree polynomials will suffice. See [57] for a discussion regarding this. In this paper, we present four variants of our scheme. Two provide strong security under the assumption that the input data has high entropy. The other two provide strong security regardless of this assumption. Section 5 generalises these four schemes to dimension k ciphertexts.
Related work
A comprehensive survey of partial, somewhat, and fully HE schemes is presented in [1] . In this section, we discuss those most related to our own work. Some related work ( [65, 76, 77] ) has already been discussed in Sect. 2.5.
Our scheme is inspired by that of van Dijk et al. [35] . In their paper they produce a fully homomorphic scheme over the integers where a simple "somewhat" homomorphic encryption scheme is "bootstrapped" to a fully homomorphic scheme. van Dijk et al. take a simple symmetric scheme where an integer plaintext m is encrypted as c = m +2r + pq, where p, the secret key, is an odd η-bit integer from the interval [2 η−1 , 2 η ), and r and q are integers chosen randomly from an interval such that 2r < p/2. The ciphertext c is decrypted by the calculation (c mod p) mod 2. Our scheme HE1N below (Sect. 3.2) may be regarded as a generalisation of theirs to arbitrary prime moduli.
van Dijk et al. transform their symmetric scheme into a public key scheme. A public key x 0 , x 1 , . . . , x τ is constructed where each x i is a near multiple of p of the form pq + r where q and r are random integers chosen from a prescribed interval. To encrypt a message a subset S of x i from the public key are chosen and the ciphertext is now calculated as c = m + 2r + 2 i∈S x i mod x 0 . The ciphertext is decrypted as previously described. We could extend our HEkN schemes here to a public key variant, using a similar device. However, we do not do so, since public key systems appear to have very little application in our model.
van Dijk et al. bootstrap their public key system using Gentry's method [44] to a fully homomorphic scheme. In this case, the bootstrapping is done by homomorphically making a suitable simulation of division by p, thus obtaining an encryption of c mod p which can be used to continue the computation. Our FHE proposal is based on entirely different principles.
Coron et al. [25, [30] [31] [32] have produced several refinements of the scheme in [35] . In [31] , the authors reduce the size of the public key by using a similar but alternative encryption scheme. In this scheme, p is a prime in the specified interval, x 0 is an exact multiple of p and the sum term in the ciphertext is quadratic rather than linear. In [32] , they apply the Brakerski et al. [18] modulus switching technique to their system from [31] . In [25] , the authors apply the Smart and Vercauteren optimisations [74] to their scheme. Finally, in [30] , they apply Brakerski's scale-invariant technique [17] to their system. Pisa et al. [64] generalise van Dijk et al.'s scheme from base 2 to base B integers. This scheme is similar to our HE1 scheme. However, our HE1 is a generalisation of van Dijk et al.'s SHE scheme to an arbitrary prime base, rather than a generalisation of the public key scheme. Ramaiah and Kumari [67] produce a variant of van Dijk et al.'s scheme with significantly smaller key sizes. Chen et al. [23] propose a more efficient re-encryption scheme that enhances van Dijk et al.'s scheme. Aggarwal et al. [2] devise a variant without bootstrapping. Nuida and Kurosawa [62] produce a scheme for non binary messages. Most recently, Wang et al. [83] have produce a variant similar to Coron et al.'s original scheme, which reduces the public key size by making the sum term cubic.
Several implementations of SHE and FHE schemes have been produced. Lauter et al. [57] implement the SHE scheme from [20] . However, they give results only for degree two polynomials. Our schemes are capable of computing degree three and four polynomials for practical key and ciphertext sizes. HELib [49] is an implementation of the BGV [18] FHE scheme. HELib-MP [69] is an adaptation of HELib to support multi-precision moduli. At the current time, it only supports basic SHE features. The HEAT (Homomorphic Encryption Applications and Technology) project's HE-API [80] (Homomorphic Encryption Application Programming Interface) has currently integrated HELib and FV-NFLib [33] , an implementation of the Fan and Vercauteren (FV) [42] SHE scheme, under a single API. The authors appear to have made significant improvements in circuit evaluation times, but few details have been made available [15] . Microsoft's SEAL library [56] also implements the FV scheme, albeit, in a modified form. FHEW [38] implements the FHE scheme given in [37] . The performance of these implementations is discussed in Sect. 8.
Erkin et al. [41] exploit the linearly homomorphic properties of Paillier to compute feature vector matches in their privacy-preserving face recognition algorithm. Our schemes can likewise compute known linear functions, simply by not encrypting the coefficients of the function.
Catalano et al. [22] aim to extend a linearly homomorphic system, such as Paillier [63] , to compute multivariate quadratics homomorphically. However, their extension relies on pre-computing a product for each pair of plaintexts and then applying a linear function on the encryption of these products. As such, it does not extend the underlying linear encryption scheme and is not multiplicatively homomorphic. They claim that their system can compute any degree 2 polynomial with at most one multiplication. However, it is not clear how they would compute the polynomial m 1 · (m 2 + . . . + m n ) without performing n − 1 offline mul-tiplications. By contrast, our scheme would only require one multiplication. In [21] , Catalano et al. extend their approach to cubics.
Zhou and Wornell [85] construct a scheme based on integer vectors, similar, in some respects, to our HE2 (Sect. 4.1) and HEk (Sect. 5) schemes. Bogos et al. [12, 13] demonstrate that the system displays some theoretical insecurities. However, the question of whether these are of practical importance is not addressed.
The symmetric MORE scheme [54] uses linear transformations, as do our schemes but in a different way. MORE has been shown [81] to be insecure against KPA, at least as originally proposed. However, whether KPA is relevant in applications of the scheme is unclear.
Recent work on functional encryption [46] should also be noted. While these results are of great theoretical interest, the scenario where such schemes might be applied is rather different from our model. Also, the methods of [46] seem too computationally expensive to be of practical interest in the immediate future.
We also note the work of Cheon et al. [26] . They use the Chinese Remainder Theorem (CRT) in an HE system. We make use of the CRT in our scheme HE2NCRT below (Sect. 6). However, our construction differs significantly from theirs.
Initial homomorphic scheme
In this section, we present details of our initial SWHE schemes over the integers.
Sufficient entropy (HE1)
We have n integer inputs m 1 , m 2 , . . . , m n ∈ [0, M). Negative integers can be handled as in van Dijk et al. [35] , by taking residues in [−( p−1)/2, (p−1)/2), rather than [0, p). We wish to compute a polynomial P of degree d in these inputs. The inputs are distributed with entropy ρ, where ρ is large enough, as discussed in Sect. 2.3. In practical terms, ρ ≥ 32 will provide sufficient entropy for strong security, since breaking the system would require more than a billion guesses. Our HE scheme is the system (KGen, Pgen, Enc, Dec, Add, Mult).
Key and parameter generation
Let λ be a security parameter, measured in bits. Let p and q be randomly chosen large distinct primes such that p ∈ [2 λ−1 , 2 λ ], and q ∈ [2 η−1 , 2 η ], where η ≈ λ 2 /ρ − λ. Here λ must be large enough to negate direct factorisation of pq (see [55] ), and p and q are chosen to negate Coppersmith's attack [29] . We will also require p > (n + 1) d M d to ensure that P (m 1 , m 2 , . . . , m n ) < p, so that the result of the computation can be successfully decrypted. Our bounds are worst case, allowing for polynomials which contain all possible monomial terms. For some applications, they will be much larger than required to ensure that P(m 1 , m 2 , . . . , m n ) < p and smaller bounds will suffice. Our algorithms KGen (Algorithm 1) and Pgen (Algorithm 2) will randomly select p and q according to these bounds. Then p is the private symmetric key for the system and pq is the modulus for arithmetic performed by Add and Mult. pq is a public parameter of the system. We assume that the entropy ρ lg λ, so that a brute force attack cannot be carried out in polynomial time.
Algorithm 1: KGen: Key Generation Algorithm
Input : λ ∈ S Output: p ∈ K: secret key 1 p ← p [2 λ−1 , 2 λ ] 2 return p
Algorithm 2: Pgen: Parameter Generation Algorithm
Input : λ ∈ S Input : ρ ∈ Z: entropy of inputs Input : p: secret key Output: modulus ∈ Z: public modulus
Security parameters
We can easily set the security parameters λ and η to practical values. To recap, n is the number of inputs, M is an exclusive upper bound on the inputs, d is the degree of the polynomial we wish to calculate. We take p ≈ 2 λ and then q ≈ 2 η , where η = λ 2 /ρ − λ, to guard against the attacks of [28, 50] .
So, we may take
Note that λ scales linearly with d and η scales quadratically. These bounds carry over to HE2 and HEk.
Encryption
We encrypt a plaintext integer m using Enc (Algorithm 3).
Algorithm 3: Enc: Encryption algorithm
Input : m ∈ M Input : p: secret key Input : modulus: public modulus
Decryption
We decrypt the ciphertext c using Dec (Algorithm 4).
Algorithm 4: Dec: Decryption algorithm
Input : c ∈ C Input : p: secret key Output: m ∈ M 1 m ← c (mod p) 2 return m
Addition
The sum modulo pq of two ciphertexts, c = m +r p and c = m + r p, is given by Add (Algorithm 5). Since Add(c, c ) =
Algorithm 5: Add: addition algorithm
Input : c ∈ C Input : c ∈ C Input : modulus ∈ Z: public modulus Output: result ∈ C 1 result ← c + c (mod modulus) 2 return result
Multiplication
The product modulo pq of two ciphertexts, c = m + r p and c = m + r p, is given by Mult (Algorithm 6). Since Mult(c, c ) = cc = mm + (rm +r m +rr p) p, it decrypts to mm , provided mm < p.
Security
Security of the system is provided by the partial approximate common divisor problem (PACDP), first posed by HowgraveGraham [50] , but can be formulated [24, 28] as:
Definition 1 (Partial approximate common divisor problem)
Suppose we are given one input x 0 , of the form pr 0 , and n Algorithm 6: Mult: multiplication algorithm A straightforward attack on this problem is by brute force. Consider x 1 . Assuming that m 1 is sampled from D, having entropy ρ, we successively try values for m 1 and compute gcd(x 0 , x 1 − m 1 ) in polynomial time until we find a divisor that is large enough to recover p. Then we can recover m i as (x i mod p) for i ∈ [2, n]. As discussed in Sect. 2.3, the search will requires 2 ρ gcd operations in expectation. Note that publicly known constants, need not, and should not be encrypted. Encrypting them provides an obvious guessing attack.
Some attempts have been made to solve the PACDP [24, 28, 50] , resulting in theoretically faster algorithms for some cases of the problem. The paper [24] gives an algorithm requiring only √ M polynomial time operations if D is the uniform distribution on [0, M), and hence, ρ = lg M. No algorithm running in time subexponential in ρ is known for this problem, so the encryption will be secure if ρ is large enough. See [43] for a survey and evaluation of attacks on PACDP. We also note the work of Cheon and Stehlé [27] which shows that Regev's "learning with errors" (LWE) problem [68] can be reduced to the approximate common divisor problem (ACDP), demonstrating that ACDP is at least as hard as LWE. LWE is the basis of many lattice based FHE schemes.
Our system is a special case of PACDP, since we use the residues modulo a distinct semiprime. A semiprime is a natural number that is the product of two primes. A distinct semiprime is a semiprime where the primes are distinct. We call this the semiprime partial approximate common divisor problem (SPACDP). It is a restriction, but there is no reason to believe that it is any easier than PACDP.
Definition 2 (Semiprime factorisation problem) Given a semiprime s, the product of primes p and q, can p and q be determined in polynomial time?
The computational complexity of this problem, which lies at the heart of the widely used RSA cryptosystem, is open, other than for quantum computing, which currently remains impractical. Strong semiprimes, as are used here, are generally believed to be the hardest to factor. We will show that breaking HE1 is equivalent to semiprime factorisation. Therefore, our scheme is at least as secure as unpadded RSA [71] .
Theorem 1 An attack against HE1 is successful in polynomial time if and only if we can factorise a distinct semiprime in polynomial time.
Proof Suppose that we have an unknown plaintext m, encrypted as c = m + r p mod pq, where r ← $ [1, q).
If we can factor pq in polynomial time, we can determine p and q in polynomial time, since we know p < q. Therefore, we can determine m = c mod p.
If we can determine m given c for arbitrary m, then we can determine r p = c − m. We are given qp, and we know 0 < r < q, so gcd(r p, qp) must be p, and we can compute p in polynomial time. Now, given p, we can determine q as qp/ p. Hence, we can factorise pq in polynomial time.
With low-entropy plaintexts, there is a brute force attack on this system, which we call a collision attack. Suppose we have a pair of equal plaintexts m 1 = m 2 . The difference between their encryptions (c 1 − c 2 ) is an encryption of 0, and KPA is possible. In fact, for n plaintexts
is an encryption of 0. However, if there is sufficient entropy, this attack is not possible.
Lemma 1 If the inputs m have entropy ρ then, for any two independent inputs m
Thus, for n inputs, m 1 , m 2 , . . . , m n the probability that there exist i, j ∈ [1, n] with m i = m j is at most n 2 2 −ρ . If n < 2 −ρ/3 , this probability is at most 2 −ρ/3 . Hence, for large enough λ, collision attack is infeasible.
Insufficient entropy (HE1N)
Suppose now that the integer inputs m i , i ∈ [1, n] , are distributed with entropy ρ, where ρ is not large enough to negate a brute force guessing attack. Therefore, we increase the entropy of the plaintext by adding an additional "noise" term to the ciphertext. This will be a multiple s (from 0 to κ) of an integer κ, chosen so that the entropy ρ = ρ + lg κ is large enough to negate a brute force guessing attack. As a result of the extra linear term in the ciphertext, we compute the quantity P(m 1 , . . . , m n , κ) instead. We can easily retrieve
Key and parameter generation
KGen (Algorithm 7) and Pgen(Algorithm 7) now randomly choose p and q as in HE1, but with η = λ 2 /ρ − λ,
The secret key, sk, is now (κ, p).
Algorithm 7: KGen: Key Generation Algorithm
Input : λ ∈ S Input : ρ ∈ Z: entropy of input Input : ρ ∈ Z: effective entropy of inputs
Algorithm 8: Pgen: Parameter Generation Algorithm
Input : λ ∈ S Input : ρ ∈ Z: effective entropy of inputs Input : (κ, p): secret key Output: modulus ∈ Z: modulus for arithmetic
Encryption
We encrypt plaintext m using Enc(Algorithm 9).
Algorithm 9: Enc: Encryption Algorithm
Input : m ∈ M Input : (κ, p): secret key Input : modulus: public modulus Output: c ∈ C 1 q ← modulus/ p 2 r ← $ [1, q) 3 s ← $ [0, κ) 4 c ← m + sκ + r p (mod modulus) 5 return c
Decryption
We decrypt ciphertext c using Dec(Algorithm 10).
Algorithm 10: Dec: Decryption Algorithm
Input : c ∈ C Input : (κ, p): secret key Output: m ∈ M 1 m ← (c mod p) mod κ 2 return m
Arithmetic
Addition and multiplication of ciphertexts are given by Algorithms 5 and 6.
Security
The use of random noise gives the encryption the following "indistinguishability" property, which we will use to show that HE1N satisfies IND-CPA [6, 7] .
Lemma 2 For any encryption c, c mod κ is polynomial time indistinguishable from the uniform distribution on [0, κ).
where the inverse p −1 of p mod κ exists since p is a prime. Hence, the total variation distance from the uniform distribution is
This is exponentially small in the security parameter λ of the system, so the distribution of c mod κ cannot be distinguished in polynomial time from the uniform distribution.
We can further show that an adversary learns nothing about the plaintexts from the size of the corresponding ciphertexts.
Lemma 3
The ciphertexts c 1 , c 2 for any plaintexts m 1 , m 2 satisfy
Similarly,
So,
We now proceed to the proof of IND-CPA. First, we define the general approximate common divisor problem (GACDP) [24, 28, 50] . 
Theorem 2 HE1N satisfies IND-CPA [6], under the assumption that GACDP is not polynomial time solvable.
Proof Suppose that known plaintexts m 1 , . . . , m n are encrypted by an oracle for HE1N, producing ciphertexts
we have an SPACDP with ciphertexts c i = m i + s i κ + r i p, and the approximate divisor p cannot be determined in polynomial time in the worst case using non-quantum methods. However, the offsets in this SPACDP are all of the form m i + s i κ, for known m i , and we must make sure this does not provide information about p. To show this, we rewrite the SPACDP as (1) where s i = s i + (m i +r i p)/κ , and m i = m i +r i p (mod κ). Now we may view (1) as a GACDP, with "encryptions" m i of the m i , and approximate divisor κ. Since the offsets m i are polynomial time indistinguishable from uniform [0, κ), from Lemma 2, we will not be able to determine κ in polynomial time. Now, the offsets m 1 , m 2 of any two plaintexts m 1 , m 2 are polynomial time indistinguishable from m 2 , m 1 , since they are indistinguishable from two independent samples from uniform [0, κ). Therefore, in polynomial time, we will not be able to distinguish between the encryption c 1 of m 1 and the encryption c 2 of m 2 .
Therefore, if A is a polynomial time adversary, from Lemmas 2 and 3 the advantage of A, is:
Therefore, HE1N is resistant to both the "guessing" and "collision" attacks discussed in Sect. 3.1. Therefore, as a result of the additional term, κ, HE1N is quantum resistant [11] despite the public semiprime modulus pq.
Lemma 4 Decrypting
Hybrid scheme
Note that mixed data, some of which has high entropy and some low, can be encrypted with a hybrid of HE1 and HE1N. More generally, we can choose s to be smaller for higher entropy and larger for lower entropy, say s ∈ [0, χ i ), where 0 ≤ χ i < κ, for the ith data type, rather than [0, κ). However, κ itself remains the same for all i, or we cannot decrypt. Then the entropy increases to ρ i + lg χ i for data type i. The advantage is a smaller blow-up in the noise. A possible disadvantage is that this mixed scheme may not necessarily have the IND-CPA property of Theorem 2. The same idea can be applied to HE2 and HE2N below, and to the HEkN schemes, for k > 2, described in Sect. 5.2.
Noise growth
So that the "noise" terms of the ciphertext do not grow sufficiently large to cause the computational result to overflow the secret modulus p, we need to control the growth of these terms. As a we are computing a polynomial of degree d, each multiplication doubles the bit length of the noise terms and each addition adds at most one bit.
To avoid overflow, as stated earlier, we set p
This is a worst case bound, based on the largest possible coefficient of any term. Depending on the particular polynomial to compute, a lower bound on p may suffice to avoid overflow.
Security parameters
Again, we can set the security parameters λ and η to practical values. For HE1N, we assume M ≈ 2 ρ , and we have ρ = ρ + lg κ. Now,
Since κ is much larger than M, we also have
Then we can calculate η as for HE1 above. Again, λ scales linearly with d and η scales quadratically. These bounds carry over to HE2N and HEkN. If we assume M ≈ 2 ρ and large enough n, as in Sect.
3.1, then we may take lg
In the extreme case that the inputs are bits, so ρ = 1, and d = 3, lg n = 16, then we can take lg κ ≈ 51 and ρ ≈ 52, and we have λ > 354, η > 2056, which is only 15% smaller than for ρ = 8.
We must also ensure that κ is large enough to make the GACDP instances hard to solve (see [24, 28, 50] for details). Note that κ q for Theorem 2 to hold.
The two schemes presented below have a constant factor overhead for arithmetic operations. An addition operation in the plaintext space requires two additions in the ciphertext space, and a multiplication in the plaintext space requires nine multiplications and four additions in the ciphertext space.
Sufficient entropy (HE2)
As noted above, in this scheme we now add a multiple of a secret vector, a = [a 1 a 2 ] T , to the ciphertext. Therefore, we encrypt m as 
We can easily see that this construction is homomorphic over addition. For HE2, we now define multiplication of ciphertexts, c 1 However, this Hadamard product will include additional a 2 1 and a 2 2 terms which means it is not a valid ciphertext. Therefore we re-encrypt by applying a matrix R to the Hadamard product to eliminate these quadratic terms. The construction of R is detailed in Sects. 4.1.1 and 4.1.5.
Key and parameter generation
p and q are randomly chosen by KGen (Algorithm 11) according to the bounds given in Sect. 3.1. (mod p and mod q) . 3 Pgen(Algorithm 12) generates R, the re-encryption matrix.
Encryption
We encrypt a plaintext integer m as the 2-vector c using Enc(Algorithm 13), where 1 = [1 1] T r and s are independent. We note that two encryptions of the same plaintext are different with very high probability. Consider first m + sa. We know that a −1 mod pq exists because a = 0 (mod p and mod q). Thus, conditional on r ,
Since this holds for any i ∈ [0, pq), m + ra + sp mod pq is a uniformly random integer from [0, pq).
Note, however, that the components of the ciphertexts are correlated, and this may be a vulnerability. We discuss this later in this section ("Cryptanalysis").
Decryption
To decrypt, we use Algorithm 14. We call the decryption vector.
Algorithm 14:
Dec: Decryption Algorithm
Addition
We define the addition operation on ciphertexts as the vector sum modulo pq of the two ciphertext vectors c and c . We achieve this by multiplying z by R. It is easy to check that R1 = 1 and Ra = a, independently of a 1 , a 2 . Now
Thus, we obtain the identity Ra •2 = p1 + σ a.
So, applying R to z , i.e. z = Rz , gives
for some integers r 2 , s 2 . So z is a valid encryption of mm and our homomorphic multiplication operation on ciphertexts is R(c • c ).
where · is a product on Z 2 pq and c • c is the Hadamard product modulo pq of the two augmented ciphertext vectors c and c (see Algorithm 16) .
Observe that α 1 , α 2 in R are public, but give only two equations for the four parameters of the system a 1 , a 2 , σ, p. These equations are quadratic mod pq, so solving them is as hard as semiprime factorisation in the worst case [66] .
Also, observe that, independently of a,
for any ciphertext c. Hence, re-encrypting a ciphertext gives the identity operation and discloses no information. 
Hardness
We can show that this system is at least as hard as SPACDP. In fact, c i2 − c i1 ). Since 0 < δ < p < q, δ is coprime to both p and q, and hence, δ −1 mod pq exists. Thus, breaking the system is equivalent to determining the m i mod p from 1, 2, . . . , n) can be done using SPACDP. However, we still need to determine a in order to determine m i . This can be done by "deciphering" R using SPACDP. We have
This can be done using SPACDP. Then a can be determined by solving the quadratic equation
This can be done probabilistically in polynomial time using, for example, the algorithm of Berlekamp [10] . So the case a = [a a+δ] T , with known δ, can be attacked using SPACDP on the system
Without knowing the parameter δ = a 2 − a 1 , HE2 cannot be reduced to SPACDP in this way, so HE2 is more secure than HE1.
Cryptanalysis
and so we have
Since a 2 = a 1 , and sr = s r with high probability, this is a nonzero multiple of p, ν p say. We may assume ν < q, so p = gcd(ν p, pq). We can now solve the linear system γ T [c c ] = [m m ] mod p to recover the decryption vector. This effectively breaks the system, since we can now decrypt an arbitrary ciphertext. We could proceed further, and attempt to infer a 1 and a 2 , but we will not do so. Note that to break this system, we need to guess two plaintexts, as opposed to one in HE1. The entropy of a pair (m, m ) is 2ρ, so we have effectively squared the number of guesses needed to break the system relative to HE1. So HE2 can tolerate smaller entropy than HE1. We note further that HE2 does not seem immediately vulnerable to known cryptanalytic attacks on HE1 [24, 28, 50] .
Insufficient entropy (HE2N)
In this section, we extend HE1N above (Sect. 3.2) to two dimensions. As with HE1N, we now encrypt by also adding a multiple of κ to produce the ciphertext c = (m + r p + sκ)1 + ta.
We decrypt by eliminating a 1 and a 2 , as in HE2, but we now take residues modulo p and modulo κ to recover the plaintext,
Our addition and multiplication operations are identical to HE2 above.
Key and parameter generation
KGen (Algorithm 17) randomly chooses p, q and κ according to the bounds given in Sect. 3.2. R is generated by Pgen (which exactly the same as Algorithm 12). The secret key is (κ, p, a) , and the public parameters are pq and R, defined in Sect. 4.1.
Algorithm 17: KGen: Key Generation Algorithm
Input : λ ∈ S Input : ρ ∈ Z: entropy of input Input : ρ ∈ Z: effective entropy of inputs Output: (κ, p, a): secret key Output: modulus: public modulus 
Encryption
Algorithm 18: Enc: Encryption Algorithm
Input : m ∈ M Input : (κ, p, a): secret key Input : modulus: public modulus
We encrypt a plaintext integer m ∈ [0, M) as a 2-vector c, using Enc (Algorithm 18). 1 is defined as in Sect. 4.1.
Decryption
Algorithm 19: Dec: Decryption Algorithm
We decrypt a ciphertext c using Dec (Algorithm 19).
Arithmetic
Addition and multiplication of ciphertexts are done using algorithms Add and Mult (which are exactly the same as Algorithms 5 and 16).
Security
HE2N has all the properties of HE1N. However, it is more secure, since there is an additional unknown parameter in the ciphertext. We also note that HE2N satisfies Theorem 2, so it inherits the IND-CPA property.
Noise growth
The "noise" grows as detailed in section 3.2.7.
Generalisation to k dimensions
In this section, we generalise HE2 and HE2N to k-vectors. HE1 and HE1N are the cases for k = 1, and HE2 and HE2N are the cases for k = 2.
Sufficient entropy (HEk)
We generalise HE2 to k dimensions. We extend our definition of an augmented vector v , for a k-vector, v, such that v is a 
-vector, with components
v i (1 ≤ i ≤ k) followed by 2v i − v j (1 ≤ i < j ≤ k). For example, if k = 3, then v = [v 1 , v 2 , v 3 , 2v 1 − v 2 , 2v 1 − v 3 , 2v 2 − v 3 ]. In general, for > k, v = 2v i − v j , where = i 2 + k + j − 1. Note that v = U k v for a
Key generation
Algorithm 20: KGen: Key Generation Algorithm
Input : λ ∈ S Input : ρ ∈ Z: entropy of inputs Output: ( p, a 1 , . . . , a k−1 ): secret key Output: modulus: public modulus 
k has no inverse then 12 return ⊥ 13 end 14 
Parameter generation
Pgen generates the k × k+1 2 re-encryption matrix, R, as detailed in Algorithm 21. We construct R so that it satisfies equation 3
This ensures that, if c is an encryption of m and c is an encryption of m , then R(c • c ) (mod pq) is a valid encryption of mm . We also construct R so that it satisfies the following identity:
This guarantees that re-encrypting a ciphertext by applying R reveals no new information.
Pgen returns a valid matrix R provided the A •2 k has an inverse. We prove that this is true with high probability in Theorem 5. In the unlikely event that this is not true, Pgen exits and we use KGen to generate new vectors a 1 , . . . , a k−1 until it is.
Theorem 5 A •2
k has no inverse mod pq with probability at most (k 2 − 1)(1/ p + 1/q).
Proof
We use the same approach as in Lemma 5. Thus,
k are quadratic polynomials over A, except for the first column, which has all 1's, and columns 2, 3, . . . , k which are linear polynomials. So det A •2 k is a polynomial over A of total degree 2
k is identically zero as a polynomial over A, the SZL [61] 
k is not identically zero as a polynomial over A in either Z p or Z q . We prove this by induction on k. Consider Z p , the argument for Z q being identical. Since Z p is a field, det A •2 k is identically zero if and only if it has rank less than k+1 2 for all A. That is, there
Clearly λ k−1,k−1 = 0. Otherwise, whatever , fi, we can choose values for a k so that L = 0, a contradiction. Now suppose λ i,k−1 = 0 for some 0 ≤ i < k − 1. The matrix A with columns a i (0 ≤ i < k − 1) contains A k−1 as a submatrix, which has rank (k − 1) with high probability by Lemma 5. Thus, β = 0 and, whatever , we can choose values for a k so that L = 0. Thus,
,k−1 as a submatrix and therefore has rank k 2 by induction. Hence, α = 0, implying L = 0, a contradiction.
Note that Theorem 5 subsumes Lemma 5, since the first k columns of A •2 k contain A k as a submatrix and must be linearly independent.
Computational overhead
The computational overhead increases, since the number of arithmetic operations per plaintext multiplication is O(k 3 ), and the space requirement per ciphertext is O(k), by comparison with HE1.
Encryption
Algorithm 22: Enc: Encryption Algorithm
Input : m ∈ M Input : ( p, a 1 , . . . , a k−1 ): secret key Input : modulus: public modulus
, is enciphered as c, a k-vector, using Algorithm 22.
Decryption
Algorithm 23: Dec: Decryption Algorithm
A ciphertext is decrypted using Algorithm 23. We call the decryption vector, as in HE2.
Addition
Addition is the vector sum of the ciphertext vectors as in HE2 (see Sect. 4.1). The Add algorithm is identical to Algorithm 15 with the exception that the vectors involved are k-vectors rather than 2-vectors.
Multiplication
Consider a Hadamard product of two augmented ciphertext vectors, c • c . For notational brevity, letm = m + r p. 
which by construction of R (Algorithm 21) has a solution. The multiplication algorithm Mult is given by Algorithm 24.
Security
We construct R so that it satisfies Equation 4: 
, which are undetermined. Thus, the system has k(k − 1) parameters that cannot be deduced from R.
Each c introduces k new parameters r p, s 1 , . . . , s k−1 and k equations, so the number of undetermined parameters is always k(k − 1).
Cryptanalysis
Note that p can be determined from m i for k ciphertexts. Let 
where r i , s i j refer to c i . Then C = A k W , and so det C = det A k det W . Note that det W = p det W , so det C is a multiple of p. Now det C can be determined in O(k 3 ) time and, if it is nonzero, p can be determined as gcd(det C, pq).
Proof From Lemma 5, det A = 0 mod p or det A = 0 mod q with probability at most (k − 1)(1/ p + 1/q). So det A is not zero or a divisor of zero mod pq. The entries of W are random [0, pq), and det W is a polynomial of total degree k in its entries. It is a nonzero polynomial, since W = I k is possible. Hence, using the SZL [61] , Pr(det W = 0 mod p) ≤ k/ p and Pr(det W = 0 mod q) ≤ k/q. So det W is zero or a divisor of zero mod pq with probability at most k(1/ p+1/q). So we have det A det W = 0 mod pq with probability at most (2k − 1)(1/ p + 1/q). So det C = 0 with high probability. 
Lemma 8 Pr(det
Since Lemma 7 holds in that case, the result follows.
Thus, with high probability, we can uniquely solve the system T C 0 = m T mod p, to recover and enable decryption of an arbitrary ciphertext. However, encryption of messages is not possible, since we gain little information about a 1 , . . . , a k . Note also that, if we determined p by some means other than using k known plaintexts, it is not clear how to recover .
To break this system, we need to guess k plaintexts. The entropy of a k-tuple of plaintexts (m 1 , m 2 , . . . , m k ) is kρ, so effectively we need μ k guesses, where μ is the number of guesses needed to break HE1. So HEk can tolerate much smaller entropy than HE1, provided k is large enough. If k is sufficiently large, the scheme appears secure without adding noise, but does not have the other advantages of adding noise.
Fixing an insecurity for k > 2
The decryption vector for HEk is
define a product · on Z k pq so that c · c = R(c • c ). This product is linear, commutative and distributive, since R and are linear operators, and • is commutative and distributive. So we have an algebra A k , with unit element 1 [72] . The i j , σ i jl (i, j, l ∈ [1, k − 1]) are the structure constants of the algebra. In general, A k will not be associative, i.e. we can
This leads to a potential insecurity. We must have
in order to have correct decryption. The associator for A k is
is an encryption of 0. If we can find k associators from c 1 , . . . , c n which violate (6), with high probability we have k linearly independent associators. We can use these 
to make a collision attack on HEk, similar to that described in Sect. 3.1. We use the gcd method to determine p, and then , as described in Sect. 5.1.9. In fact, all we need is that (6) holds for any associator. That is, for all c 1 , c 2 , c 3 , we need
or, equivalently, using the Chinese Remainder Theorem,
By linearity, (7) holds if and only if it holds for all basis elements, excluding the identity. That is, for all i, j, l
The associator for A k is
for some integers r , s 1 , . . . , s k−1 , and so
If A k is associative, the problem does not arise, since (8) will be satisfied automatically. Associativity holds if k ≤ 2. All we have to check is that a · (a · a) = (a · a) · a, which is true by commutativity. Thus, HE1, HE2 cannot be attacked in this way. However, this collision attack becomes possible even when k = 3.
Requiring associativity in A k overconstrains the system, imposing k k+1 2 equations on the k k+1 2 structure constants. With only k(k−1) undetermined parameters, this is too much. But all we need is that (8) holds. We have
Lemma 9 Equation (8) holds if and only if, for all
t=1 σ i jt lt , and the lemma follows. Now we can ensure (8) by giving the i j a multiplicative structure.
Lemma 10 Let
Thus, the conditions of Lemma 10 are sufficient to remove the insecurity. The price is that we now have (k − 1)
independent parameters. This is fewer than the original k(k − 1), but remains Ω(k 2 ).
As a result, the parameter generation algorithm Pgen is amended to Algorithm 25.
Insufficient entropy (HEkN)
We generalise HE2N to k dimensions.
Key generation
Algorithm 26: KGen: Key Generation Algorithm
Input : λ ∈ S Input : ρ ∈ Z: entropy of inputs Input : ρ ∈ Z: entropy of inputs Output: ( p, a 1 , . . . , a k−1 ): secret key Output: modulus: public modulus
KGen (Algorithm 26) randomly chooses κ, p and q according to the bounds outlined in Sect. 4.2 and sets a j ∀ j. Note that, as a result of adding the "noise" term, defence against non-associativity is not required. Therefore, Pgen, which generates R, is Algorithm 21. The secret key, sk, is (κ, p, a 1 , . . ., a k−1 ) , and the public parameters are pq and R.
Encryption
Algorithm 27: Enc: Encryption Algorithm
, is enciphered by Algorithm 27.
Decryption
Algorithm 28: Dec: Decryption Algorithm
A ciphertext is deciphered by Algorithm 28.
Arithmetic
The addition and multiplication algorithms are as in Sect. 5.1.
Security
The effective entropy of HEkN is ρ = k(ρ + lg κ). Thus, as we increase k, the "noise" term can be made smaller while still providing the requisite level of entropy.
Clearly HEkN also inherits the conclusions of Theorem 2, so this system also satisfies IND-CPA.
Noise growth
An extension of HE2N using the Chinese Remainder Theorem (HE2NCRT)
As an interesting aside, we extend HE2N (Sect. 4.2) using a technique inspired by Chinese Remainder Theorem (CRT) secret sharing, so that we compute the final result modulo a product of primes K j=1 p j rather than modulo p, where K is the number of primes.
In this scheme, we distribute the computation. We have K sets of processors. Each processor computes arithmetic on ciphertexts modulo p j q j , where p j , q j are suitable primes. Each plaintext is encrypted as K ciphertexts where each processor receives the jth ciphertext vector. Addition and multiplication of ciphertexts on processor j are as defined in Sect. 4.1, except that it is performed modulo p j q j .
This serves two purposes. The first is to be able to handle larger moduli by dividing the computation into subcomputations on smaller moduli. The second is to mitigate against exposure of the secret key p in the system presented in Sect. 4.2, by not distributing the modulus pq to each processor. Instead, we distribute p j q j to the jth processor, for j ∈ [1, K ] . This allows us to replicate the computation where each subcomputation is encrypted using different parameters. Thus, should an attacker compromise one subcomputation, they may gain no knowledge of other subcomputations.
Key generation
Algorithm 29: KGen: Key Generation Algorithm
Input : λ ∈ S Input : ρ ∈ Z: entropy of input Input : ρ ∈ Z: effective entropy of inputs Output: (κ, p 1 , p 2 , . . . , p K , a 1 , . . . , a K ): secret key Output: modulus 1 , modulus 2 , . . . , modulus K : public moduli (κ, p 1 , p 2 , . . ., p K , a 1 , . . ., a K ), modulus 1 , modulus 2 , . . ., modulus K
The key generation process, KGen (Algorithm 29) randomly chooses κ as in Sect. 3.2. For all j ∈ [1, K ], it randomly chooses a prime p j such that p j satisfies 2 λ−1 < p j < 2 λ and
It also randomly chooses q j , 
The parameter generation routine Pgen (Algorithm 30) generates each re-encryption matrix
The secret key, sk, is (κ, 
Encryption
We encrypt an integer, m ∈ M, as the set of K 2-vectors, c j using Algorithm 31.
Decryption
To decrypt a set of K ciphertexts we use Algorithm 32. We first decrypt the jth ciphertext of the computational result, c j , as in Sect. 4.1, to give
where
Algorithm 32: Dec: Decryption Algorithm
We then use the Chinese Remainder Theorem to compute the plaintext as
Note that μ j is a residue rather than a plaintext value.
Note that learning p j on one processor does not allow an attacker to reconstruct the m i . Rather they only learn m i +s i j κ (mod p) j .
Arithmetic
Algorithm 33: Add j : addition algorithm for processor j Input : c j ∈ C Input : c j ∈ C Input : modulus j ∈ Z: modulus for arithmetic Output:
Addition of ciphertexts on processor j is performed using Algorithm 33. Multiplication of ciphertexts on processor j is performed by Algorithm 34.
Extending HE2NCRT to k-vectors
Clearly HEkN could be extended to HEkNCRT in a similar way to the extension of HE2 to HEk. Future work will discuss the details of such a scheme. From [51] , the definition of an arithmetic circuit is:
Definition 4 (Arithmetic Circuits) An arithmetic circuit Φ over the ring R and variables X = {x 1 , . . . , x n } is a directed acyclic graph with every node of indegree either two or zero, labelled in the following manner: every vertex of indegree 0 is labelled by either a variable in X or an element of R. Every other node in Φ has indegree two and is labelled by either × or +. A circuit Φ computes a polynomial f ∈ R[X ] in the obvious manner. An arithmetic circuit is called a formula if the outdegree of each node in it is one (and so the underlying graph is a directed tree). The size of a circuit is the number of nodes in it, and the depth of a circuit is the length of the longest directed path in it.
To transform HEk to a fully homomorphic system, we define encryption of the circuit inputs as in HEk. Similarly, addition and multiplication of ciphertexts at each arithmetic node of the circuit are defined as in the HEk scheme. This way we are able to compute the arithmetic circuit homomorphically. However, this system is still "somewhat" homomorphic. If the computational result grows larger than p, we are unable to successfully decrypt the result. This restricts us to circuits of bounded depth to avoid this plaintext blow-up. To make it fully homomorphic, we consider Boolean circuits [82] . A Boolean circuit is defined in [82] as: circuit over a basis B, with n inputs and m outputs, is then defined as a finite directed acyclic graph. Each vertex corresponds to either a basis function, which we call a gate, or one of the inputs, and there are a set of exactly m nodes which are labelled as the outputs. The edges must also have some ordering, to distinguish between different arguments to the same Boolean function.
We note that any finite computation can be represented as a Boolean circuit.
Typically, the basis B will be the Boolean functions, AND, OR, and NOT. However, a Boolean circuit may be alternatively represented using only NAND gates [73] . The indegree of any gate in the directed acyclic graph G = (V , E) is then always 2, but the outdegree may be arbitrary. We will refer to the directed edges of this graph as wires. We note that, for a Boolean circuit, the inputs to each gate are bits, as are the outputs. We will denote the set of inputs to the circuit by I ⊆ V , and the set of outputs from the circuit by O ⊆ V . In G, the inputs have indegree 0, and the outputs have outdegree 0, but we will regard the inputs as having indegree 1, and the outputs as having outdegree 1, with wires from and to the external environment Λ.
Note Then c is an encryption of 0 with probability 1 2 . If we multiply ν of these ciphertexts, the probability that none of them is an encryption of zero is 2 −ν , so we obtain an encryption of zero with probability 1 − 2 −ν . So, with ν repetitions of this process, if ν = 2 lg k, this is 1 − 1/k. By repeating the whole process Ω(k) times, we can obtain k encryptions of zero with high probability. Once we have done this, we can use the gcd method of 5.1.9 to determine p.
Therefore, we encrypt both the inputs to the circuit, and the values on the wires, using HEk. On each wire e ∈ E, we will represent the bit value b e ∈ {0, 1} by w e ∈ {ω 0e , ω 1e }, where ω 0e , ω 1e ∈ [0, q) are random even and odd integers, respectively. Thus, b e = w e mod 2. For each input i ∈ I , we represent the input bit value b i similarly, by x i ∈ {ω 0i , ω 1i }.
An input i ∈ I has a wire (Λ, i) on which the (encrypted) input value x i is stored. For any wire e = (i, v) from input i, we have a linear function L(x) = a + bx, which converts the plaintext input value x ∈ {α 0 , α 1 } to the wire value w ∈ {γ 0 , γ 1 }. It is easy to check that this requires
Fig. 2 An output wire on a NAND gate
The encrypted coefficients of this function are stored as data for the wire e (see Fig. 1 ). Note that all computations are mod pq, and the required inverses exist because the numbers involved are less than q. For each output wire e = (v, v ) of a NAND gate v, we have a quadratic function Q(x, y) = a + bx + cy + dx y, which converts the values on the input wires of the gate, x ∈ {α 0 , α 1 }, y ∈ {β 0 , β 1 }, to the wire value w ∈ {γ 0 , γ 1 }. It is easy to check that this requires
encrypted coefficients of this function are stored as data for the wire e (see Fig. 2 ). For each output NAND gate v ∈ O, we decrypt the value w ∈ {γ 0 , γ 1 } computed by its (unique) output wire (v, Λ). Then the output bit is w mod 2.
Thus, we have replaced the logical operations of the Boolean circuit by evaluation of low-degree polynomials. For simplicity, we have chosen to use only NAND gates, but we can represent any binary Boolean function by a quadratic polynomial in the way described above. Since the quadratic polynomials are encrypted in our system, they conceal the binary Boolean function they represent. Thus, the circuit can be "garbled" [8, 45] , to minimise inference about the inputs and outputs of the circuit from its structure.
However, there is a price to be paid for controlling the noise. The encrypted circuit is not securely reusable with the same values ω 0e , ω 1e for w e . Suppose we can observe the encrypted value on wire e three times giving ciphertexts c 1 , c 2 , c 3 . Two of these are encryptions of the same value 2s 0,e or 1 + 2s 1,e . Thus, (c 1 − c 2 ) · (c 1 − c 3 ) · (c 2 − c 3 ) is an encryption of 0. By doing this for k wires, we can break the system. This is essentially the collision attack described in Sect. 3.
Some reuse of the encrypted circuit is possible by using multiple values on the wires and higher degree polynomials for the gates. However, we will not consider this refinement, since the idea seems to have little practical interest.
As we discuss in Sect. 5.1, the security of HEk is exponential in k, so by setting k large enough we make brute force attacks on the system infeasible. (A brute force attack succeeds in polynomial time only if k = O(log log p).) Therefore, if we compute encrypted Boolean circuits, our system is fully homomorphic.
Experimental results
HE1, HE1N, HE2, and HE2N have been implemented in pure unoptimised Java using the JScience mathematics library [34] . Secure pseudo-random numbers are generated using the ISAAC algorithm [52] , seeded using the Linux /dev/random source. This prevents the weakness in ISAAC shown by Aumasson [5] .
The evaluation experiment generated 24,000 encrypted inputs and evaluated a polynomial homomorphically on the inputs, using a Hadoop MapReduce (MR) algorithm. On the secure client side, the MR input is generated as pseudorandom ρ-bit integers which are encrypted and written to a file with d inputs per line, where d is the degree of the polynomial to be computed. The security parameters λ and η were selected to be the minimum values required to satisfy the conditions give in Sects. 3.1, 3.2, 4.1, and 4.2. In addition, the unencrypted result of the computation is computed so that it may be checked against the decrypted result of the homomorphic computation. On the Hadoop cluster side, each mapper processes a line of input by homomorphically multiplying together each input on a line and outputs this product. A single reducer homomorphically sums the products. The MR algorithm divides the input file so that each mapper receives an equal number of lines of input, ensuring maximum parallelisation. Finally, on the secure client side, the MR output is decrypted.
Our test environment consisted of a single secure client (an Ubuntu Linux VM with 16GB RAM) and a Hadoop 2.7.3 cluster running in a heterogeneous OpenNebula cloud. The Hadoop cluster consisted of 17 Linux VMs, one master and 16 slaves, each allocated 2GB of RAM. Each experimental configuration of algorithm, polynomial degree (d), integer size (ρ), and effective entropy of inputs after adding "noise" (ρ , for the 'N' variant algorithms only) was executed 10 times. The means are tabulated in Table 1 .
There are some small anomalies in our data. JScience implements arbitrary precision integers as an array of Java long (64-bit) integers. This underlying representation may be optimal in some of our test configurations and suboptimal in others, causing anomalous results. Another possibility is that the unexpected results are due to garbage collection in the JVM heap, which may be more prevalent in certain test configurations.
We may compare these results with those reported in the literature. Our results compare extremely favourably with Table 2 of [57] . For encryption, our results are, in the best case, 1000 times faster than those presented there, and, in the worst case, 10 times faster. For decryption, our results are comparable. However, it should be noted that to decrypt our results we take the moduli for large primes rather than 2 as in [57] , which is obviously less efficient. For homomorphic sums and products, our algorithms perform approximately 100 times faster. [57] only provides experimental data for computing degree 2 polynomials. We provide experimental results for higher degree polynomials.
Similarly, compared with Fig. 13 of Popa et al. [65] , our encryption times for a 32-bit integer are considerably faster. While a time for computing a homomorphic sum on a column is given in Fig. 12 , it is unclear how many rows exist in their test database. Nevertheless, our results for computing homomorphic sums compare favourably with those given. Since CryptDB [65] only supports homomorphic sums and cannot compute an inner product, we can only compare the homomorphic sum timings. Table 1 of [76] is unclear whether the timings are aggregate or per operation. Even assuming that they are aggregate, our results are approximately 100 times faster for homomorphic sum and product operations. Crypsis [76] uses two different encryption schemes for integers, ElGamal [40] and Paillier [63] , which only support addition or multiplication but not both. No discussion of computation of an inner product is made in [76] , but we expect that the timings would be considerably worse as data encrypted using ElGamal to compute the products would have to be shipped back to the secure client to be re-encrypted using Paillier so that the final inner product could be computed.
Varia et al. [79] present experimental results of applying their HETest framework to HELib [48] . Varia et al. show timings 10 4 to 10 6 times slower than that of computations on unencrypted data. Although it is unclear exactly which circuits are being computed, the timings given are in seconds, so we believe that HELib will not be a serious candidate for SSCC in the immediate future.
As reported in [37] , the current computational performance of FHEW [38] is poor compared with unencrypted operations. The authors report that FHEW processed a single homomorphic NAND operation followed by a re-encryption in 0.69s and using 2.2GB of RAM. Therefore, we also believe that FHEW is not a candidate for SCCC, as it currently stands.
Although claims regarding its performance have appeared in the press [78] , no benchmarking statistics have been made publicly available for Microsoft's SEAL library [56] . However, in [3] , it is reported that, for SEAL v1, the time to perform one multiplication is approximately 140 ms.
With regard to FV-NFLib [33] , Bonte et al. [15] recently reported a significant decrease in the time to evaluate a four layer Group Method of Data Handling (GMDH) neural network [16] from 32 to 2.5 s, as a result of their novel encoding of the inputs. Aguilar-Melchor et al. [3] report experimental findings regarding HELib-MP [69] . They show that HELib-MP outperforms FV-NFLib for large (2048-bit) plaintexts. They further go on to benchmark HELib-MP by computing RSA-2048 and ECC-ElGamal-P256. An exponentiation in RSA-2048 takes between 157ms and 1.8s depending on the window size and number of multiplications required. For ECC-ElGamal-P256, an elliptic curve multiplication takes between 96ms and 242ms depending on window size and number of elliptic curve additions.
Catalano et al. [22] provide experimental results for their work. For 128-bit plaintexts, our algorithms are approximately 10-1000 times faster at performing a multiplication operation and our most complex algorithm, HE2N, is roughly equal to their fastest, an extension of Joye-Libert [53] , for additions. Table 2 Timings for each experimental configuration (n = 106,272,000 in all cases, λ > 96). Init is the initialisation time for the encryption algorithm, Enc is the mean time to encrypt a single integer, Exec is the total MR job execution time, Prod is the mean time to homomorphically compute the product of two encrypted integers, and Sum is the mean time to homomorphically compute the sum of two encrypted integers Yu et al. [84] give experimental results for their implementation of the Zhou and Wornell scheme [85] . From their Figures 3-5 , it is hard to compare our scheme with theirs directly but it would appear that our vector-based schemes are at least comparable in performance to theirs.
Microsoft Azure cloud
In addition to performing our experiments in a small private cloud, we also scaled our experiment to a large cluster in Microsoft's Azure public cloud 4 . Our experimental environment consisted of a HDInsight cluster comprising two D13v2 head nodes and 123 D4v2 worker nodes (984 worker cores).
The number of inputs was increased to 106,272,000 for each experimental configuration. As a result of the large volume of input data, our experiments were altered to create and encrypt the data in situ. This encrypted data is then consumed by our experimental program. As before, the output from out experiment was downloaded to a secure client and decrypted to verify the result. In addition, as a result of the larger number of inputs, we employed a tighter upper bound (nM d /d) on the values of p and κ required to successfully decrypt the HE1/HE2 and HE1N/HE2N variants, respectively.
The results for each experimental configuration are presented in Table 2 . Comparing it with Table 1 shows only an increase of approximately 300% in average encryption and product calculation times for our most complex algorithm (HE2N), despite the 4,428-fold increase in the number of inputs. The fact that these times did not scale linearly with the number of inputs may largely be attributed to the increased memory per worker node (28GB versus 2GB) and the tighter bounds on p and κ. However, we also note that the bit size of the arbitrary precision integers involved will scale logarithmically in the number of inputs as a result of the tighter bound. Hence, the timings for arithmetic operations on those integers will also scale logarithmically.
Conclusion
In this paper, we have presented several new homomorphic encryption schemes intended for use in secure single-party computation in the cloud (SSCC). We envisage that the majority of computation on integer big data, outside of scientific computing, will be computing low-degree polynomials on integers, or fixed-point decimals which can be converted to integers. Our somewhat homomorphic schemes are perfectly suited to these types of computation.
Our evaluations have concerned only one-or two-dimensional ciphertexts and polynomials of degree up to four. We intend to investigate higher degree polynomials in future work. We believe that HE1N and HE2N provide strong security, even for low-entropy data, as they satisfy the desirable IND-CPA property. If a user has a high confidence in the entropy of the input data, HE2 may provide sufficient security.
As they are only somewhat homomorphic, each of these schemes require that the computational result cannot grow bigger than the secret modulus. In the case of the "noise" variants, we also have to consider the noise term growing large. So, as they stand, these schemes can only compute polynomials of a suitably bounded degree. However, we believe this is adequate for most practical purposes.
A further concern is that the ciphertext space is much larger than the plaintext space. This is as a result of adding multiples of large primes to the plaintext. However, we have shown that values exist which makes the system practical for computing low-degree polynomials. Similar schemes [31, 35] produce ciphertexts infeasibly larger than the corresponding plaintext, which is a single bit. For example, it should be noted that even the practical CryptDB [65] , which is only additively homomorphic, enciphers a 32-bit integer as a 2048-bit ciphertext. Our schemes will produce ciphertext of similar size, if high security is required. However, if the security is only intended to prevent casual snooping, rather than a determined cryptographic attack, the ciphertext size can be reduced. Observe that the parameters of the system will change for each computation, so a sustained attack has constantly to relearn these parameters. Of course, if the attacker is able to export data for offline cryptanalysis, only high security suffices.
The schemes presented in Sects. 3 and 4 extend to a hierarchy of systems, HEk, with increasing levels of security. These are presented in Sect. 5 and may be investigated further in future work. As stated in Sect. 6, we can extend HE2NCRT to k-vectors to create a HEkNCRT scheme. The discussion will appear in future work. We also showed that our HEk system can be extended to an FHE system. We may also investigate several enhancements of this FHE system. First, we could implement a packed ciphertext optimisation for our scheme where an operation is performed on a vector of ciphertexts rather than a single ciphertext [75] . We can also investigate an improvement to address circuit privacy [19] . Finally, we can investigate applying the Chinese Remainder Theorem secret sharing method employed in HE2NCRT (Sect. 6) to our fully homomorphic scheme (Sect. 7).
We have implemented and evaluated the schemes HE1, HE1N, HE2, and HE2N as part of an SSCC system as discussed in Sect. 8. Our results are extremely favourable by comparison with existing methods. In some cases, they outperform those methods by a factor of 1000. We have also performed extensive experiments with large data sets (approximately 100 million inputs) and shown that the increase in time to perform encryption and arithmetic operations grows sublinearly in the number of inputs. This clearly demonstrates the practical applicability of our schemes. Furthermore, our MapReduce job execution times remain low even when using the largest set of parameters for HE2N. We believe that this demonstrates the advantages of these schemes for encrypted computations on fixed-point data in the cloud.
To conclude, we believe that the work in this paper has achieved our goal of providing a homomorphic encryption scheme over the integers suitable for SSCC. In particular, our work significantly outperforms related work [65, 76, 77] with regard to the running time of arithmetic operations on encrypted data.
